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II.-258 
NARROWING IN ON THE PROBLEM: A 
COMPONENT-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF 
“HYBRID” MEDICAL DEVICES 
Abstract: The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (“MDA”) classify medi-
cal devices into three categories, each of which represents a different level of 
risk, and requires a different level of federal oversight. Class III devices, 
which pose the most risk, are subject to the highest level of oversight. Those 
devices are protected from any claims based on state laws that differ from or 
add to the requirements imposed by the MDA. On March 1, 2018, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, 
PLC, considered the application of preemption under the MDA to a “hybrid” 
device, which was made up of various Class II components and one Class III 
device. The Third Circuit held that these devices are to be considered at the 
component level, thus allowing hybrid devices with Class III components to 
be protected from state-law claims. This Comment argues that the Third Cir-
cuit’s level of analysis, which looked at the requirements imposed on the spe-
cific component at issue rather than the device itself, was the proper method 
of evaluation. 
INTRODUCTION 
The principal objective of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 
(“MDA”) to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is to maximize the 
safety and effectiveness of medical devices, especially as society becomes 
increasingly reliant on various types of medical equipment.1 The MDA cat-
egorizes medical devices into three different classes by evaluating the level 
                                                                                                                           
 1 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012 & Supp. 2017) (the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act defines 
“device” as “an instrument, apparatus, implant, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or 
other similar or related article”); see Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 474 (1996) (citing 
Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (“MDA”), Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976)) (dis-
cussing the history and purpose behind the MDA). The FDCA originally set forth regulations 
requiring premarket approval only for new drugs but had no such requirements for the introduc-
tion of medical devices into the market. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 475 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-853, at 6 
(1976); S. REP. NO. 93-670, at 1–2 (1974); David F. Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 
1938: Its Legislative History and Its Substantive Provisions, 6 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROB. 2, 40 
(1939)). The technologies used in medical devices became increasingly sophisticated, however, 
thus resulting not only in increased reliance on these devices, but also in more serious injuries 
being incurred when they failed. See id. (pointing to a notable intrauterine contraceptive device 
from 1970 whose ineffectiveness and failure led to a substantial amount of unintended pregnan-
cies, serious infections, and, in some cases, death). The higher level of public concern over the 
safety and reliability of these medical devices eventually led to Congress’s enactment of the 
MDA. Id. at 476. 
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of risk that each device presents and classifying them accordingly.2 Each 
class of devices must therefore undergo different approval processes and 
meet different safety and effectiveness requirements before they can be 
marketed to the public.3 Class I medical devices are ones that pose little risk 
of harm to patients and are therefore subject to minimal federal oversight.4 
Class II medical devices, which have the potential to be more dangerous, 
must comply with additional performance standards the federal government 
sets forth to be marketed.5 Class III medical devices pose the greatest risk 
of harm to patients and therefore receive the highest level of federal over-
sight, which often entails individualized requirements imposed on each de-
vice that condition the device’s ability to enter and remain on the market.6 
                                                                                                                           
 2 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1). 
 3 Id. For a detailed explanation of the different approval processes and requirements, see infra 
notes 4–6, 15–21 and accompanying text. 
 4 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A) (identifying Class I medical devices as ones for which “general 
controls” are “sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the 
device,” or, alternatively, as medical devices that lack sufficient information to establish that gen-
eral controls would sufficiently assure that the device is both safe and effective but that the device 
is not intended to support or sustain human life and does not pose an unreasonable risk to patients’ 
health and safety); see Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 316 (2008) (noting that examples 
of Class I devices are ones such as “elastic bandages and examination gloves”). Because they pose 
relatively low risks of harm, these devices are subject only to “general controls,” which are im-
posed on all medical devices. See 21 U.S.C. § 331 (prohibiting the “adulteration” and “misbrand-
ing” of medical devices); see, e.g., id. § 351 (setting forth the various ways in which a device may 
be deemed “adulterated,” such as by containing poisonous substances or being produced in insani-
tary conditions); id. § 352 (setting forth the ways in which a device may be deemed “misbranded,” 
including containing false or misleading labeling or lacking sufficient instructions and warnings 
on the label); see also Riegel, 552 U.S. at 322 (characterizing general manufacturing and labeling 
requirements as “applicable across the board to almost all medical devices”). 
 5 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (identifying Class II medical devices as ones for which “general 
controls by themselves are insufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effec-
tiveness of the device, and for which there is sufficient information to establish special controls to 
provide such assurance”); see Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316 (setting forth examples of Class II medical 
devices to include “powered wheelchairs and surgical drapes”). Class II medical devices are often 
subject to “special controls,” which entail additional safety and effective requirements such as 
“performance standards, postmarket surveillance, patient registries, development and dissemina-
tion of guidelines . . . .” 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B). 
 6 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii)(I)–(II) (stating that a medical device will be categorized as 
Class III when the requirements imposed on either Class I or Class II devices are deemed insuffi-
cient to “provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device” and the de-
vice is “purported or represented . . . to . . . support[] or sustain[] human life[,] . . . prevent[] im-
pairment of human health,” or the device “presents a potential unreasonable risk of illness or inju-
ry”); see Riegel, 552 U.S. at 317 (identifying examples of Class III medical devices as “replace-
ment heart valves, implanted cerebella stimulators, and pacemaker pulse generators”). Manufac-
turers of Class III medical devices must submit an extensive application to the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) in order to receive premarket approval. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 317–18. The 
FDA must then spend a significant amount of time reviewing the device’s application and will 
often subject these devices to individualized requirements or performance standards on which 
their approval to enter the market and ability to remain on the market are conditioned. Id. at 318–
19. 
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The MDA also has a preemption provision that prohibits state and local 
governments from enacting requirements directed at the safety and effec-
tiveness of medical devices if their requirements either differ from or add to 
those imposed under the MDA.7 
In a case of first impression, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit, in Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC (Shuker II), considered 
the application of the MDA to a medical device that consisted of multiple 
components, one of which came from a different Class III device although 
the rest were components of a Class II device.8 Taking into consideration 
the fact that a device’s classification affects the application of the preemp-
tion provision, the Third Circuit had to decide whether to analyze the device 
at the component-level, thus focusing on the Class III component that was 
the source of the plaintiffs’ claims, or at the device-level, therefore regard-
ing the overall system as a Class II device.9 After considering the text and 
application of the MDA, as well as guidance from the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (“FDA”), the court held that the device should be analyzed at 
the component-level.10 
This Comment argues that the Third Circuit properly analyzed the de-
vice at the component-level.11 Part I discusses the legal and factual history 
of Shuker II.12 Part II sets forth the arguments made by the parties in favor 
of either a device-level or component-level approach.13 Lastly, Part III ar-
                                                                                                                           
 7 See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012) (prohibiting state and local governments from imposing or 
continuing to impose on medical devices any requirement “which is different from, or in addition 
to, any requirement applicable under this Act” and “which relates to the safety or effectiveness of 
the device”); see also Riegel, 552 U.S. at 323–25 (applying the MDA’s preemption provision to 
common-law claims against a Class III catheter that received premarket approval and concluding 
that the claims are preempted because they are premised upon safety and effectiveness require-
ments that differ from or add to device-specific federal requirements); Lohr, 518 U.S. at 493–94, 
496–97 (finding that state-law claims of negligence against the manufacturers of a pacemaker are 
not preempted because the device was only subject to generically applicable federal requirements, 
rather than device-specific ones, and because some of the claims were based on state requirements 
that mirrored federal ones and were therefore not different or additional). 
 8 Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC (Shuker II), 885 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2018) (referring to 
the hip replacement system as a “hybrid system” because it is a device itself but is made up of 
components that are Class II as well as Class III). 
 9 See id. at 767–68, 772 (noting that Class I and II devices do not receive preemption protec-
tions but that Class III devices may receive such protection, and addressing the issue of how to 
apply the preemption analysis to a hybrid device). See generally infra, notes 24–30 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the ways in which a medical device’s classification and approval process 
affects whether or not the preemption provision applies to that device). 
 10 See Shuker II, 885 F.3d at 772–74 (concluding that a component-level analysis is the proper 
approach); see also infra notes 45–50, 67–76 and accompanying text (describing the court’s hold-
ing and reasoning). 
 11 See infra notes 15–76 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 15–50 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 51–66 and accompanying text. 
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gues in favor of the court’s ruling that hybrid devices should be analyzed at 
the component-level.14 
I. LEGAL AND FACTUAL CONTEXT 
Section A of this Part discusses the various classifications and approval 
processes under the MDA and the ways in which they affect a preemption 
analysis under the MDA.15 Section B of this Part examines the factual and 
procedural history of Shuker II.16 
A. The Medical Device Amendments: Classifications and Preemption 
The rigorous “premarket approval” process for a Class III device re-
quires the manufacturer to submit a detailed report discussing the device’s 
safety and efficiency to the FDA and provide it with a sample of the device 
and its proposed labeling, which establishes the device’s conditions of use.17 
The FDA spends, on average, approximately 1,200 hours reviewing these 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See infra notes 67–76 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 17–30 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 31–50 and accompanying text. 
 17 See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2017) (requiring the report to include, for exam-
ple, any pertinent information regarding the device’s safety and effectiveness, a description of the 
device’s components and properties as well as how the device is operated, and a detailed descrip-
tion of the device’s manufacturing); 21 C.F.R. § 814.20 (2018) (listing additional requirements for 
a premarket approval application); Daniel W. Whitney, Guide to Preemption of State-Law Claims 
Against Class III PMA Medical Devices, 65 FOOD DRUG L.J. 113, 115 (2010) (describing the 
premarket approval process). There are, however, two exceptions to the premarket approval re-
quirement, which have led to a majority of Class III devices entering the market without undergo-
ing the premarket approval process. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1) (setting forth exceptions to the 
premarket approval requirement for Class III devices); see also Riegel, 552 U.S. at 317 (citing 
PETER B. HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 992 (3d ed. 2007) (noting that in 2005, 3,148 de-
vices were approved through a process known as the Section 510(k) process while only thirty-two 
devices were approved through the premarket approval process); Lohr, 518 U.S. at 477, 479 (cit-
ing H.R. REP. NO. 101–808, at 14 (1990)) (identifying a general trend of Class III devices entering 
the market without receiving premarket approval and specifically noting a 1990 report that found 
that eighty percent of Class III devices instead entered the market through the Section 510(k) 
process). The first exception, which is often referred to as a “grandfathering provision,” allows a 
Class III device that was already on the market at the time the MDA was enacted to remain so 
until the FDA completes the premarket approval process for that device. See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360e(b)(1)(A) (requiring the granting of premarket approval to Class III devices that were “in-
troduced . . . before the date of enactment”); see also Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478 (noting Congress’s 
intent to prevent existing devices from being pulled from the market). The second allows a new 
device to enter the market if the FDA finds it to be “substantially equivalent” to a pre-existing 
device on the market through what is referred to as the Section 510(k) process. See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360e(b)(1)(B) (requiring premarket approval for Class III devices that are “substantially equiva-
lent to another device”); see also Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478 (noting Congress’s intent to “prevent 
manufacturers of grandfathered devices from monopolizing the market while new devices clear 
the PMA hurdle, and to ensure that improvements to existing devices can be rapidly introduced 
into the market”). 
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applications and, after weighing the device’s possible benefits and risks, 
grants premarket approval only if the manufacturer has provided sufficient 
assurance that the device is both safe and effective.18 
The FDA may impose additional requirements or restrictions on a 
Class III device as a condition to its approval to enter or remain on the mar-
ket.19 After receiving premarket approval, the device must continue to be 
manufactured and marketed in a way that is entirely consistent with the re-
quirements set forth in the FDA’s premarket approval order.20 Health care 
practitioners, on the other hand, are afforded much more discretion in that 
respect, and are thus not prohibited from prescribing or administering these 
devices for “off-label” usage for purposes other than what the FDA has ap-
proved.21 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(2)(C) (requiring that the benefits and risks of the device be 
weighed against each other in the analysis of a premarket approval application); id. § 360e(d) 
(describing the process by which premarket approval may be granted or denied); Riegel, 552 U.S. 
at 318 (providing a detailed description of the FDA’s process and standards for reviewing pre-
market approval applications); see also 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(2) (requiring that, in its evaluation of 
a device’s possible benefits and risks, the FDA must take into consideration the patients for whom 
the device is intended and the suggested conditions of use as provided by the label). 
 19 See 21 C.F.R. § 814.82 (stating, for example, the FDA may require periodic post-approval 
reports on the device’s safety, post-approval reports on any clinician investigations, or the inclu-
sion of specific information and warnings in any advertisements for the device); Whitney, supra 
note 17, at 116–17 (describing the reporting requirements for Class III devices after approval has 
been granted) see, e.g., Gelber v. Stryker Corp., 788 F. Supp. 2d 145, 151–52, 160–61 (W.D. Pa. 
2012) (discussing the obligation of the manufacturer of a hip replacement system to report any 
ongoing clinical investigations or studies). 
 20 21 C.F.R. § 814.80. 
 21 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2012) (“Nothing in this Act . . . shall be construed to limit or interfere 
with the authority of a health care practitioner.”); see Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 
531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001) (noting the widely accepted importance of giving health care practition-
ers the flexibility to use medical devices as they see fit, and explaining that although the FDA 
seeks to ensure patients’ safety with regards to medical devices, the regulations it sets forth are not 
meant to “interfer[e] with the practice of medicine”); Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Navigating Be-
tween Scylla and Charybdis: Preemption of Medical Device “Parallel Claims,” 9 J. HEALTH & 
BIOMEDICAL L. 159, 165–71 (2013) (noting the general lack of success of lawsuits against manu-
facturers in circumstances of off-label use). Off-label use of drugs and devices by physicians is 
common and many regard it as an important part of the practice of medicine. See Marcia Boumil, 
FDA Approval of Drugs and Devices: Preemption of State Laws for “Parallel” Tort Claims, 18 J. 
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1, 5 (2015) (noting the American Medical Association’s support of 
physicians’ off-label use of FDA-approved drugs and devices); John J. Smith, Physician Modifica-
tion of Legally Marketed Medical Devices: Regulatory Implications Under the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosemtic Act, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 245, 250–52 (2000) (providing an example in 
which a certain type of stent did not sufficiently address the medical needs of patients until physi-
cians created custom stents made from multiple FDA-approved products); James M. Beck & Eliz-
abeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconcep-
tions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 72, 76–80 (1998) (noting the frequency of off-label use and that 
many within the medical community deem it to be an essential practice and that it leads to “state-
of-the-art treatment,” in part due to the fact that medical discovery may move at a faster rate than 
the FDA’s regulatory process). 
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Class I and Class II medical devices, however, have a far less rigorous 
standard of review and are subjected to fewer requirements.22 These devices 
often undergo what is referred to as the “Section 510(k) process,” which 
requires the manufacturer to report to the FDA the device’s class and the 
steps that the manufacturer has taken to comply with the specific require-
ments imposed on that class.23 
By prohibiting state and local governments from imposing different or 
additional requirements on the safety or efficiency of medical devices, the 
MDA preempts many state-law actions that challenge a device’s compliance 
with such requirements.24 Preemption is only afforded, however, when there 
are federal requirements that pertain specifically to the device in question 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A) (identifying Class I medical devices as ones for which gen-
eral controls, such as universal labeling requirements, are sufficient to assure that the device is 
both safe and effective); id. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (identifying Class II medical devices are ones for 
which general controls do not provide sufficient assurance of the device’s safety and effectiveness 
and therefore require “special controls” such as performance standards or postmarket surveil-
lance). 
 23 See id. § 360(k) (setting forth requirements for the Section 510(k) process); see also Lohr, 
518 U.S. at 478 (explaining that the Section 510(k) process, the name of which originates from its 
original section within the MDA, is also known as the “premarket notification” process and is the 
same process by which manufacturers notify the FDA of their intention to market a device that is 
“substantially equivalent” to a pre-existing device on the market). Because many of the evalua-
tions that are made under the Section 510(k) process are focused on the device’s equivalence to 
another device, rather than its safety and effectiveness, this process does far less to protect pa-
tients. Shuker II, 885 F.3d at 767 (citing Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478). 
 24 See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 324–25 (finding that the MDA bars certain claims based on state-
imposed requirements and noting that the definition of a state requirement within the context of 
preemption under the MDA is not limited to state statutes and regulations, but rather also includes 
state common-law duties); 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1) (prohibiting state and local governments from 
imposing safety requirements on medical devices that either differ from or add to federal require-
ments). Although the MDA preempts state-law claims based on requirements that are either dif-
ferent from or in addition to federal requirements, states are allowed to provide for damages for 
violations of state laws that simply mirror federal requirements, which are often referred to as 
parallel claims. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(2); see also Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330 (noting that the MDA 
does not preempt parallel claims, which are based on state laws that do not differ from or add to 
federal requirements). Moreover, in addition to being expressly preempted under § 360k(a), a 
claim may also be impliedly preempted when it conflicts with the overall federal statutory scheme. 
See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 348–50 (finding that a fraud-on-the-FDA claim was impliedly preempt-
ed because it conflicted with the FDA’s delegated authority to enforce the MDA, an authority that 
the Court finds to be critical to the MDA, because the claim rested only on violations of federal 
law rather than state law). When a state tort claim against a medical device relies exclusively on 
violations of federal requirements, it conflicts with Congress’s intention that the MDA be enforced 
only by the federal government and may therefore be impliedly preempted. See id. at 352 (noting 
Congress’s intent that the MDA be enforced exclusively by the FDA); see also Eggen, supra note 
21, at 165–71 (discussing express and implied preemption under the MDA). Thus, although paral-
lel claims are not expressly preempted, they may still be impliedly preempted and the Supreme 
Court has offered little guidance as to which claims may survive implied preemption. See id. at 
168 (noting that the Supreme Court left open the question as to whether and when a parallel claim 
may overcome implied preemption and discussing disagreements amongst lower courts). 
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rather than generic requirements that are imposed on all devices.25 The pro-
cess by which a medical device has been approved has a significant impact 
on whether or not a manufacturer must answer to state law liability.26 The 
Section 510(k) process, which evaluates a device’s equivalence to a preex-
isting device, requires manufacturers to demonstrate only that they have 
complied with all generic requirements.27 Accordingly, because it does not 
impose device-specific requirements, devices that are approved through this 
process do not receive preemption from common-law claims such as negli-
gence or strict liability.28 The premarket approval process, by contrast, is 
primarily concerned with the safety of devices and accordingly calls for an 
extensive review of each device in order to impose individualized require-
ments.29 As such, Class III devices that have received premarket approval 
are entitled to preemption protections from any different or additional state 
law requirements for their safety or effectiveness, regardless of whether 
third parties actually use them in FDA-approved manners.30 
B. Shuker’s Factual and Procedural History 
In 2009, Walter Shuker received a total hip replacement surgery.31 The 
hip replacement system, called the R3 Acetabular System, was a Class II 
                                                                                                                           
 25 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d). To determine whether a claim is preempted, the Riegel Court set forth 
a two-step framework for analysis in which it first determined whether the individual device had 
specific requirements prescribed by the federal government, and second determined whether the 
plaintiff’s claim was based on state requirements regarding the safety and effectiveness of that 
device that either add to or differ from the federal requirements. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 321–22. 
 26 See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 322–23 (comparing the applicability of the MDA’s preemption 
provision to devices approved through the Section 510(k) process and devices that received pre-
market approval); Lohr, 518 U.S. at 493–94 (declining to preempt claims against a device that 
received approval through the Section 510(k) process because it did not impose device-specific 
requirements); see also Keith N. Hylton, An Economic Perspective on Preemption, 53 B.C. L. 
REV. 203, 217, 219–20 (2012) (arguing that, among other factors, courts should generally be more 
willing to preempt state-law claims when the agency, which holds far more expertise, employs a 
more rigorous regulatory process). 
 27 21 U.S.C. § 360(k); see supra note 21 and accompanying text (noting that many of the 
Section 510(k) evaluations that are made are ones in which the FDA must determine whether a 
device is substantially equivalent to a preexisting one). 
 28 See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 493–94 (declining to preempt certain state law claims against a de-
vice because it underwent the Section 510(k) process and therefore was not subject to any device-
specific requirements). 
 29 See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text (explaining the premarket approval process). 
 30 See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 323–25 (affording preemption to a Class III device because the 
premarket approval process subjected it to federal safety and effectiveness requirements and the 
state-law requirements were different or additional); supra note 21 and accompanying text (noting 
that manufacturers are not liable for off-label usage of medical devices as prescribed and adminis-
tered by health care professionals and discussing the acceptance and necessity of off-label usage in 
the practice of medicine). 
 31 Shuker v. Smith & Nephew PLC (Shuker I), No. 13-6158, 2015 WL 1475368, at *3 (E.D. 
Pa. Mar. 31, 2015), aff’d 885 F.3d 760 (3d Cir. 2018). 
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device that the FDA approved through the Section 510(k) process.32 The 
system was made up of numerous components, all of which were manufac-
tured by Smith & Nephew.33 One component of the system the plaintiff’s 
doctor used was called the R3 metal liner.34 The R3 metal liner was a Class 
III device that received supplemental premarket approval as an additional 
component for a different Class III device, the Birmingham Hip Resurfac-
ing System, which the defendant also manufactured.35 Shortly after receiv-
ing supplemental premarket approval for the R3 metal liner, the defendant 
issued a press release announcing the new product as an option to use in the 
R3 Acetabular System.36 The press release stated that the R3 metal liner 
was approved for the Birmingham Hip Resurfacing System but it did not 
mention the fact that the FDA had not considered its safety when used in the 
R3 Acetabular System.37 Moreover, because the FDA had not approved the 
R3 metal liner for use in a total hip replacement system, the plaintiff’s doc-
tor’s implementation of it consisted of an “off-label” use.38 
Nearly two years after the surgery, Mr. Shuker started feeling pain and 
discomfort around his hip.39 His surgeon originally performed two proce-
dures in an attempt to locate the source of his pain and alleviate it, but ulti-
                                                                                                                           
 32 Id. at *1 n.6 (the system contains four main components, each of which were individually 
approved through the Section 510(k) process and permitted to be used as a part of the R3 Acetabu-
lar System). 
 33 Id. at *1 (the R3 Acetabular System, as approved by the FDA, consists of an acetabular 
shell, a polyethylene liner, a femoral head, and a femoral stem). The total hip replacement system 
implemented by Mr. Shuker’s doctor, however, differed from that approved by the FDA in that it 
replaced the polyethylene liner with an R3 metal liner. Id. at *3. 
 34 Id. at *3. 
 35 Id. at *2 (the R3 metal liner that the plaintiff’s doctor used had received supplemental pre-
market approval to be used in the pre-existing Birmingham Hip Resurfacing System, which also 
underwent the premarket approval process). The R3 metal liner’s approved labeling specifically 
stated that it was only meant to be used as a part of the Birmingham Hip Resurfacing System and 
warned that it should be replaced with a polyethylene liner if a total hip replacement system is 
implemented. Id. 
 36 Id. at *3. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. (noting that Mr. Shuker’s surgeon’s implementation of the R3 metal liner in the system 
was an off-label use because the FDA had not approved it to be used in that context). A physi-
cian’s “off-label” use of a medical device is widely accepted. See supra note 21. The defendants, 
however, had issued a press release in February 2009 promoting the use of the R3 metal liner in 
total hip replacements without FDA approval. Shuker I, 2015 WL 1475368, at *3 n.12. This, the 
Shukers argued, constituted “off-label promotion,” which, unlike off-label usage, has been inter-
preted by many to be a violation of the MDA. Id. at *13; see Whitney, supra note 17, at 130 
(characterizing medical devices that have been the subject of off-label promotion as misbranded 
and adulterated under the MDA). The defendants’ off-label promotion of the R3 metal liner was 
the premise of the plaintiffs’ parallel claims, which were dismissed for failure to state a claim. 
Shuker I, 2015 WL 1475368, at *14. 
 39 Shuker I, 2015 WL 1475368, at *3. 
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mately had to remove and replace the entire system.40 Mr. Shuker and his 
wife subsequently filed suit alleging violations of both common law and 
federal law.41 Smith & Nephew moved for summary judgment on the state 
law claims of negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranty, 
arguing that the MDA preempted the claims because they imposed different 
or additional requirements.42 The District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, in its opinion in 2015 in Shuker v. Smith & Nephew PLC 
(Shuker I), granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding 
that the claims were preempted because the R3 metal liner had received 
premarket approval.43 In addition, the court dismissed the Shukers’ parallel 
claims, which based several state law tort claims on the defendant’s off-
label promotion of the R3 metal liner in violation of FDA regulations, for 
failure to state a claim.44 
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the state law 
claims based on the safety and effectiveness of the R3 metal liner were 
preempted and held that a hybrid device must be analyzed at the compo-
nent-level.45 In its reasoning, the court first pointed to the relevant statutory 
language of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which defines a 
                                                                                                                           
 40 Id. (the surgeon determined that the pain had been caused by “the degeneration of the met-
al-on-metal articulation of his artificial hip”). 
 41 Id. at *4 (the preempted claims set forth in the First Amended Complaint included “negli-
gence/negligence per se, negligence based on violations of various FDA regulations, strict prod-
ucts liability, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranties of merchantability, fraud 
and loss of consortium”). 
 42 Id. at *5. 
 43 Id. at *4 (pointing to the fact that the R3 metal liner appeared to be the source of the plain-
tiff’s injuries and “at the heart of” the claims). Moreover, the court notes the fact that the particu-
lar combination of components used was put together by the plaintiff’s surgeon, thus qualifying 
this as an off-label use. Id. at *7. 
 44 Id. at *13–14 (for example, the plaintiffs based a negligence claim on the fact that the de-
fendants had engaged in false and misleading advertising by indicating in the press release that the 
R3 liner was a safe option for the R3 Acetabular System). Although these claims were not neces-
sarily preempted because they were based on violations of federal laws that could be interpreted to 
prohibit off-label promotion, the district court dismissed these claims, finding that there were 
insufficient facts to support an inference that the press release was misleading enough to consist of 
off-label promotion, or that any off-label promotion by the defendants actually influenced Mr. 
Shuker’s doctor to use the R3 metal liner instead of the poly liner. Id. The plaintiffs were given the 
opportunity to amend their complaint with respect to their parallel claims and ultimately their 
Third Amended Complaint based claims of negligence, loss of consortium and fraud on the de-
fendants’ off-label promotion of the liner, claiming that the off-label promotion was a violation of 
federal requirements. Shuker v. Smith & Nephew PLC, 211 F. Supp. 3d 695, 696, 699 (E.D. Pa. 
2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 885 F.3d 760 (3d Cir. 2018). The district court dismissed these 
claims, however, again finding that there were insufficient facts to support a reasonable inference 
that the defendants’ press release actually promoted off-label use of the R3 metal liner. Id. at 704–
05. 
 45 Shuker II, 885 F.3d at 774–75. 
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“device” to include its components and accessories.46 The court also noted 
the MDA’s anticipation and acceptance of third party off-label usage of de-
vices and noted that the deconstructing of a device and extracting of an in-
dividual component for a separate use qualifies as such an accepted prac-
tice.47 Lastly, the court pointed to the FDA’s stance, which was largely in-
formed by the statutory definition of “device” and the acceptance of off-
label usage, in concluding that the device should be analyzed at the compo-
nent level.48 As such, the Third Circuit held that a hybrid device is to be 
evaluated at the component level and accordingly applied the framework set 
forth in the Supreme Court’s 2008 opinion in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. to 
the R3 metal liner, affirming that its premarket approval preempted any 
claims against its safety and effectiveness that are based on state law.49 
With respect to the parallel claims, on the other hand, the court held 
that there were sufficient facts to adequately plead that Smith & Nephew’s 
characterization of the R3 metal liner as an option for the R3 Acetabular 
System consisted of off-label promotion that resulted in Mr. Shuker’s inju-
ries and thus violated both state and federal laws.50 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Id. at 772 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)). The court also noted that this is consistent with a foun-
dational rule of statutory interpretation that seeks to give meaning to all parts of a statute. Id. at 774 
(citing Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)). See generally 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (“[t]he 
term ‘device’ . . . means an instrument, apparatus, implant, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro 
reagent, or other similar or related article, including any component, part, or accessory”) (emphasis 
added). 
 47 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001); Shuker II, 885 F.3d, at 
772–73 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 352(q)–(r), 360e(d)(1)(A)); Letter Brief at 8–9, Shuker II, 885 F.3d 
760 (No. 16-3785), 2017 WL 4151264 at *8–9 (noting that manufacturers must still comply with 
the premarket approval requirements set forth by the federal government, regardless of how third 
parties use the device and that Congress intended to protect manufacturers who have done so from 
state law liability); see supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of off-label 
use). 
 48 Shuker II, 885 F.3d at 773 (citing Letter Brief, supra note 47, at 7); see infra notes 64–66 
and accompanying text (describing the FDA’s arguments). Although the court noted that it does 
not necessarily defer to agencies’ interpretation when it comes to preemption, these interpretations 
are given weight to the extent that they are persuasive. Shuker II, 885 F.3d at 773 (citing Skidmore 
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1994)); see Jamelle C. Sharpe, Legislating Preemption, 53 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 184–85 (2011) (discussing the deference that the Supreme Court has 
given to the FDA in preemption analyses and noting that the Court appears to be suggesting that 
“Skidmore deference” is proper, meaning that courts should base the weight that they give agency 
interpretations on its persuasiveness and thoroughness). 
 49 Shuker II, 885 F.3d at 774–75 (applying the Riegel framework to the R3 metal liner and 
concluding, first, that the federal government did impose device-specific requirements through the 
premarket approval process and, second, that the Shukers’ claims of negligence, strict liability, 
and breach of implied warranty did impose requirements that are different from those imposed by 
the federal government). 
 50 Id. at 776–79 (discussing the claims of negligence, loss of consortium, and fraud based on 
the defendants’ off-label promotion of the R3 metal liner). With respect to the negligence claim, 
the court noted that the fact that the R3 metal liner was approved only to be used in the Birming-
ham Hip Resurfacing System supported an inference that the defendants had a duty not to publish 
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II. A PRELIMINARY QUESTION TO THE RIEGEL FRAMEWORK:  
WHAT IS THE DEVICE AT ISSUE? 
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals noted in 2018 in Shuker v. Smith 
& Nephew. PLC (Shuker II), before applying the preemption analysis to a 
medical device, it may be necessary to first determine what the device at 
issue is.51 Because the device in question in Shuker II was made up of com-
ponents that fell into different classifications, it could either be analyzed by 
looking at the device as a whole, or by looking at the specific component at 
issue.52 Section A of this Part discusses the arguments the Shukers put forth 
in Shuker II in favor of analyzing the device as a whole.53 Section B of this 
Part discusses the arguments in favor of analyzing the device at the compo-
nent-level, which both Smith & Nephew and the FDA supported.54 
A. The Device-Level Approach 
In arguing that the device as a whole should be analyzed, the Shukers 
contended that the hip replacement system was approved as a Class II de-
vice and could not be transformed into a Class III device merely because of 
one implemented Class III component that received premarket approval.55 
The Shukers also emphasized the fact that the FDA had never approved nor 
                                                                                                                           
false or misleading advertising, that the defendant’s characterization of the R3 metal liner as an 
option for the R3 Acetabular System can be interpreted as a breach of that duty, and that Mr. 
Shuker’s doctor was aware of, and thus potentially influenced by, this characterization when he 
decided to use the R3 metal liner instead of the polyethylene liner. Id. at 777–78. Next, the court 
found that the loss of consortium claim was derivative of the Shukers’ claim of negligence and 
was therefore also adequately pleaded. Id. at 778. Although the court found that the fraud claim 
was not adequately pleaded because there were insufficient facts to support an inference that Mr. 
Shuker’s doctor relied on the off-label promotion in his decision to use the R3 metal liner, the 
district court’s dismissal of the fraud claim was reversed because the plaintiffs were not given a 
sufficient opportunity to amend their complaint. Id. at 778–79. 
 51 Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC (Shuker II), 885 F.3d 760, 772 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting that 
the two-step analysis set forth in the Supreme Court’s 2008 opinion in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. 
has an implicit presumption that there is an agreement as to what the device in question is, and 
that in cases where there is no such agreement a preliminary determination of the device is re-
quired before applying the Riegel framework); see supra note 25 (describing the Riegel frame-
work). 
 52 Shuker II, 885 F.3d at 772. 
 53 See infra notes 55–59 and accompanying text. 
 54 See infra notes 60–66 and accompanying text. 
 55 See Brief of Appellants at 18–19, Shuker II, 885 F.3d 760 (No. 16-3786), 2017 WL 
413755, at *18–19 (pointing to a number of district court decisions supporting this concept); see, 
e.g., Huskey v. Ethicon, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 736, 747 (S.D.W.V. 2014) (declining to preempt 
state-law claims against a Class II device despite the fact that one component was a Class III pre-
market- approved device); Gross v. Stryker Corp., 858 F. Supp. 2d 466, 487 (W.D. Pa. 2012) 
(finding a hip replacement system to be a Class III premarket-approved device despite the fact that 
one component was a Class II device approved through the Section 510(k) process). 
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analyzed the specific system implanted in Mr. Shuker—that being the par-
ticular combination of components his physician used.56 Thus, the Shukers 
argued, the fact that the R3 metal liner was determined to be safe for its use 
in the Birmingham Hip Resurfacing System did not guarantee that it would 
be safe in other types of devices, including the R3 Acetabular System.57 The 
plaintiffs also pointed to the logistics of the component-level approach, argu-
ing that analyzing each particular component within a device would be overly 
complicated and illogical.58 Lastly, they expressed concern that manufactur-
ers could avoid liability simply by using one component that received pre-
market approval in a device that was otherwise approved through the Sec-
tion 510(k) process, thus undermining the primary purpose of the MDA, 
which is to ensure that all devices on the market are safe and effective.59 
B. The Component-Level Approach 
The defendants, on the other hand, pointed to the fact that the FDA 
simply regulates devices, not the ways in which they may be used.60 Alt-
hough the FDA can impose requirements on a device’s manufacturing, de-
sign and label, including the proposed conditions of use, healthcare practi-
tioners are not obliged to follow the FDA-approved label’s conditions of 
use.61 As such, a physician’s decision to use a device or its component in an 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See Brief of Appellants, supra note 55, at 22; see also Huskey, 29 F. Supp. 3d at 747 (find-
ing that the premarket approval of one component does not inherently approve that component’s 
use in all medical devices because the FDA only considers its use in the specific device being 
analyzed). 
 57 See Brief of Appellants, supra note 55, at 22; see also Huskey, 29 F. Supp. 3d at 747 (citing 
Lewis v. Johnson & Johnson, 991 F. Supp. 2d 748, 760–762 (S.D.W.V. 2014)) (noting that the 
FDA found that a specific type of suture was safe when used in the recommended manner but they 
did not evaluate whether it would be safe when sewn together to create a mesh product). 
 58 Brief of Appellants, supra note 55, at 19–22 (citing Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 
769, 780 (D. Minn. 2009)) (“[i]f components of a PMA-approved device work together as a single 
medical device, then tearing the components apart to apply a different preemption analysis ‘makes 
no sense’”); see also Huskey, 29 F. Supp. 3d at 748 (finding that a separate analysis of each com-
ponent would “create chaos in a field that is already difficult to navigate”); Gross, 858 F. Supp. 2d 
at 487 (noting that the added level of complication of doing individual analyses was not contem-
plated by Congress); Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 780 (D. Minn. 2009) (finding 
that individual analyses of components “make[] no sense” when considered in light of the fact that 
the components function together as a single device). 
 59 Brief of Appellants, supra note 55, at 22–23. See generally MDA, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 
Stat. 539 (1976) (stating that the MDA is meant to “provide for the safety and effectiveness of 
medical devices”). 
 60 See Answer Brief of Smith & Nephew, Inc. at 23–24, 885 F.3d 760 (16-3785), 2017 WL 
1132944 at *23–24 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360k; Riley, 625 F.Supp.2d at 779) (“Class III devices and 
components used off-label continue to fall within the protection of section 360k because the FDA 
does not regulate a device’s use. Rather, the FDA regulates the device itself.”). 
 61 Id. at 24, 26; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the acceptance of 
physicians’ off-label use of medical devices). 
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off-label manner would not create liability on behalf of the manufacturer.62 
Thus, according to the defendants, any challenges to the R3 metal liner’s 
safety or effectiveness must be preempted because the component received 
premarket approval and had met the requirements imposed through that ap-
proval process.63 The FDA, in an amicus brief, took a similar position as the 
defendants, arguing that the requirements the federal government imposed 
on a device or component were unaffected by a third party’s off-label use 
and thus a preemption analysis should also remain unaffected by such a 
use.64 Moreover, the FDA emphasized the fact that the statutory definition 
of “device” included each of the device’s components.65 Lastly, the FDA 
made a policy argument pointing to the fact that Congress delegated regula-
tory power to the FDA to set standards and requirements for medical devic-
es and that manufacturers who adhered to these standards were warranted 
the benefits of preemption.66 
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT PROPERLY EVALUATED THE  
“HYBRID” DEVICE AT THE COMPONENT-LEVEL 
In its analysis of the system implanted in Mr. Shuker at the compo-
nent-level, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in 2018, in Shuker v. Smith & 
Nephew, PLC (Shuker II), afforded the defendants preemption protection 
from any state law claims that challenged the safety or effectiveness of the 
R3 metal liner and were based on requirements that differed from or added 
to those the federal government imposed.67 The court’s consideration of the 
                                                                                                                           
 62 Answer Brief of Smith & Nephew, Inc., supra note 60, at 26. 
 63 Id. at 28. 
 64 Letter Brief, supra note 47, at 7–8 (citing Caplinger v. Medtronic, Inc., 784 F.3d 1335, 
1344 (10th Cir. 2015)) (“FDA’s premarket approval of the BHR system imposed requirements 
specific to the metal liner that preclude changes to the liner’s design, manufacture, and labeling 
without further approval by FDA. Those requirements apply equally when third parties put the 
liner to an unapproved use.”). 
 65 Id. at 7 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)). 
 66 Id. at 9 (“Congress entrusted FDA with determining which device designs should be ap-
proved for marketing, as well as how approved devices should be labeled . . . . Section 360k(a) 
acknowledges FDA’s judgment in this respect and prevents states from pursuing competing judg-
ments . . . . That provision also protects manufacturers that have complied with detailed federal 
requirements from being subjected to liability under state law for doing what federal law re-
quired.”). The FDA also argues that those of the Shukers’ claims that are not expressly preempted 
may still be impliedly preempted, pointing to the possibility that these claims may conflict with 
the overall scheme of the MDA. Id. at 6, 13–14. See generally supra note 24 (discussing implied 
preemption). They acknowledge, however, that the defendants did not raise such a defense and 
thus the court may be disinclined to address the issue of implied preemption. Letter Brief, supra 
note 47, at 6, 13–14. Ultimately, the Third Circuit found that because the defendants did not raise 
any implied preemption arguments, the analysis should be limited to express preemption princi-
ples. Shuker II, 885 F.3d at 770 n.8. 
 67 Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC (Shuker II), 885 F.3d 760, 775 (3d Cir. 2018). 
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FDA’s interpretation of the issue is consistent with Supreme Court prece-
dent, which has also relied heavily on the FDA’s position in interpreting 
ambiguities in the MDA, and the notion that the FDA has the unique exper-
tise to interpret the laws that it implements.68 
Both the Third Circuit and the FDA correctly noted that the statutory 
definition of “device” includes any component of one.69 Thus, as a matter of 
statutory interpretation, when the MDA affords manufacturers the benefits 
of preemption with regards to a device that has met all federally imposed 
requirements, these benefits should also be afforded when the component of 
a device has met these requirements.70 The same is true as a matter of poli-
cy: a manufacturer that has complied with the specific requirements regard-
ing a component’s safety and effectiveness should not be deprived of 
preemption protection merely because a third party has extracted the com-
ponent to use it in a different device.71 
                                                                                                                           
 68 See 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2012) (vesting “[t]he authority to promulgate regulations for the 
efficient enforcement of [the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act] . . . in the Secretary”); Med-
tronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495–96 (1996) (finding support for an interpretation of preemp-
tion under the MDA by looking to the FDA’s regulations that interpret the relevant statutory pro-
visions and noting that, consistent with 21 U.S.C. § 371(a), the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services delegated authority to the FDA to promulgate regulations); Hillsborough Cty. v. Auto-
mated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 714 (1985) (finding the FDA’s position to be “dispositive” in 
resolving a preemption issue); Shuker II, 885 F.3d at 773; 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(e) (2012) (granting 
the FDA authority to determine whether a specific state requirement falls within the scope of the 
MDA preemption provision). Although the Third Circuit Court of Appeals clarified in its 2018 
opinion in Shuker II that they do not necessarily defer to the FDA’s stance in preemption analyses, 
they concluded that the FDA’s view is, in fact, “entitled to respect . . . to the extent [they] ha[ve] 
the power to persuade.” 885 F.3d at 773 n.11 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1994)); see Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (“The weight of such a 
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those fac-
tors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”); Sharpe, supra note 48, at 186 
(noting that Skidmore deference is likely the proper level of deference in preemption analyses and 
that agency views “will be informative but not dispositive”). 
 69 Shuker II, 885 F.3d at 772; Letter Brief, supra note 47, at 7. See generally 21 U.S.C. 
§ 321(h) (“The term ‘device’ . . . means an instrument, apparatus, implant, machine, contrivance, 
implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any component, part, or 
accessory.”) (emphasis added). 
 70 See Shuker II, 885 F.3d at 772–73 (finding support for the component-level approach in 
both the MDA’s definition of device, which includes components, and in the MDA’s contempla-
tion and acceptance of off-label usage by third parties); Letter Brief, supra note 47, at 6 (noting 
that a component of a device that has received premarket approval is also considered a “device” 
and that the approval of such a component is often premised upon device-specific requirements). 
See generally Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (“one of the most basic interpre-
tive cannons [is] that [a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so 
that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, or void or insignificant”) (internal quotations omit-
ted); Sharpe, supra note 48, at 179 (noting that the Supreme Court in 2008 in Riegel v. Medtronic, 
Inc. largely relied on the statutory language of the MDA in its decision). 
 71 See Letter Brief, supra note 47, at 9 (“[the preemption] provision also protects manufactur-
ers that have complied with detailed federal requirements from being subjected to liability under 
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The court’s holding is also consistent with the notion that, because the 
MDA was not enacted to interfere with the practice of medicine or overstep 
the judgment of physicians, a healthcare practitioner’s off-label usage of a 
medical device is an acceptable, if not encouraged, practice under the 
MDA.72 Thus, a manufacturer that has complied with all federal require-
ments is still protected from liability when a health care practitioner uses 
the device in an off-label manner.73 Given the statutorily equivalent treat-
ment of devices and their components, it follows that a manufacturer should 
be afforded the same protection when a third party uses one of its device’s 
components—rather than the device itself—in a way that is contradictory to 
the FDA-approved manner of usage.74 
Lastly, this interpretation of the MDA does not necessarily leave the 
plaintiffs, or others similarly situated, entirely without remedy; they can still 
allege parallel claims.75 The Third Circuit’s decision to allow the claims 
based on Smith & Nephew’s off-label promotion to go forward is consistent 
with the MDA’s preemption provision because, if there is a finding that the 
defendants in fact violated a federal regulation, it allows the plaintiffs to be 
                                                                                                                           
state law for doing what federal law required”); see also infra notes 72–74 and accompanying text 
(discussing off-label usage by third parties and its effect on preemption analyses). 
 72 See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (“Nothing in [the MDA] shall be construed to limit or interfere with 
the authority of a health care practitioner.”); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 
341, 350 (2001) (discussing the acceptance and importance of off-label usage of medical devices 
and noting that the MDA is not meant to constrain a physician’s ability to use a device as he or she 
sees fit); Beck & Azari, supra note 21, at 72, 76–80 (discussing the importance of off-label use by 
physicians and arguing that it is an integral part of medicine by allowing doctors to treat patients 
by implementing new and effective uses for drugs and devices without having to go through the 
lengthy FDA-approval process). 
 73 See supra notes 21, 72 and accompanying text (discussing the acceptance and necessity of 
off-label usage of medical devices as prescribed and administered by health care professionals). 
 74 See Letter Brief, supra note 47, at 9 (arguing that a manufacturer’s compliance with the 
“design, manufacture, or labeling” requirements, which are directed at the component’s safety and 
effectiveness, should continue to warrant protection from liability when a third party uses the 
component in an unapproved manner); supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text (discussing the 
statutory treatment of the components of a device as devices themselves). 
 75 See Shuker II, 885 F.3d at 776 (reversing the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ 
parallel claims that were based on the defendants’ off-label promotion in violation of federal re-
quirements). Thus, if the plaintiffs are able to prove on remand that the defendants’ off-label promo-
tion influenced the plaintiff’s doctor to use that particular combination of components, they may still 
be able to recover some damages from the defendants. Id. Although there are uncertainties regarding 
the extent to which parallel claims may be impliedly preempted, some have noted that claims of off-
label promotion may survive preemption. See Boumil, supra note 21, at 40–42 (discussing a case in 
which plaintiffs were able to reach an $85 million settlement arising out of an off-label promotion 
claim); Whitney, supra note 17, at 129 (discussing ways in which plaintiffs may successfully bring 
claims based on off-label promotion); Kevin Costello & Eric Johnston, Manufacturer Liability for 
Off-Label Uses of Medical Devices, L.A. LAW., Apr. 2008, at 18–19 (noting that off-label promotion 
may be a source of liability for manufacturers but that plaintiffs may face substantial evidentiary 
burdens). 
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compensated for any violations of the requirements imposed by the MDA’s 
premarket approval process.76 
CONCLUSION 
When it comes to predicting which medical devices will be afforded 
preemption under the MDA, the Supreme Court’s guidance seems pretty 
clear: Class III devices that have received premarket approval will receive 
preemption because they are subject to device-specific federal require-
ments, whereas Class II devices have no such requirements and will there-
fore remain subject to liability. It becomes less clear, however, when a phy-
sician implements a device that he or she altered by combining components 
from Class II and Class III devices. 
The Third Circuit properly addressed this issue, holding that when a 
medical device is made up of components that fall into different classifica-
tions under the MDA, any preemption analysis must be applied to the spe-
cific component in question. This decision is consistent with the statutory 
definition of device under the MDA, which includes in it any components 
thereof. Moreover, it is congruent with the position of the FDA, to whom 
Congress granted a great deal of discretion due to their expertise. Lastly, it 
allows physicians to continue to utilize devices in off-label manners, a prac-
tice that is widely supported in both the legal and medical fields, in order to 
provide the best medical treatment for their patients without holding manu-
facturers liable for their decisions. 
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 76 Shuker II, 885 F.3d at 776. 
